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Abstract
Having undergone mergers with Uber China and Uber Southeast Asia in the past few years, DiDi
and Grab now hold over 90% and 80% of the market shares in China and Singapore. This market
control has allowed them to dominate the rideshare industry in the two countries, and this paper
examines the impact of Grab and DiDi’s monopolistic power on rideshare drivers. Specifically,
this research considers changes to both licensure requirements, pricing policies, commission
rates, insurance coverage, and CSR programs as well as long-term corporate objectives and
strategies following the merger. In order to understand the implications of DiDi and Grab’s
decrease in competition and greater market control, this research draws from existing scholarly
research, DiDi and Grab’s policies and terms of use, news articles, reports, government
documents, and most importantly, qualitative interviews with employees at DiDi and Grab. The
paper concludes that despite changes in pricing, insurance, and benefits, monopolistic
ridesharing companies are able to leverage their resources and market power for diversification,
which creates synergies, and greater social impact.
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Introduction
In the past decade, the world has witnessed the rapid rise of the gig economy, a market system
based on temporary contract work as opposed to permanent employment. Because the gig
economy affords workers a greater degree of flexibility and independence, people are
increasingly choosing to take on gig work over traditional job arrangements. The ridesharing
industry comprises an especially large segment of the growing gig economy. Since the founding
of Uber in 2009, ride hailing businesses have taken off around the world, gaining an especially
strong foothold in Asia with Didi Chuxing (DiDi) in China and Grab in Southeast Asia, among
others.
While the U.S. rideshare industry remains divided between Uber and Lyft, companies like DiDi
and Grab have acquired much greater market control in some of the markets that they operate in.
DiDi and Grab merged with Uber China and Uber Southeast Asia in 2016 and 2018 respectively,
and the two companies now exercise monopoly power in China and Singapore.1, 2
This research study seeks to examine how DiDi and Grab have taken advantage of the market
control and lack of competition in these two markets to shape the landscape of the ridesharing
industry in Asia. While news media and existing scholarly research are both relatively attuned to
the rider experience and riders’ demands and concerns, this research looks at the implications of
the monopolistic market control of ride hailing companies for rideshare drivers. Specifically, this
study aims to understand the changes that are brought about by the decrease in competition and
greater market control following mergers in this industry as well as how drivers experience these
changes. While monopolies are frequently viewed as socially nonoptimal and inefficient, this
research explores how monopolies in the rideshare industry have used their monopoly power to
improve the driver experience and engage in social impact. Beyond examining key changes in
DiDi and Grab’s licensure requirements, pricing policies, commission rates, insurance coverage,
and CSR programs, this research also assesses long-term changes in corporate objectives and
strategies. After providing some background information on these two companies and the
ridesharing industry at large, this paper will dive into specific post-merger business decisions and
strategies before closing with an analysis of the applicability of these lessons and findings to the
ride hailing industry in the United States and beyond.

1

Savannah Dowling, "How Didi Partnered And Burned Its Way To Market Leadership In China," Crunchbase, last
modified May 23, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020,
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/how-didi-partnered-and-burned-its-way-to-market-leadership-in-china/.
2
Jon Russell, "Grab's acquisition of Uber Southeast Asia drives into problems," TechCrunch, last modified April 25,
2018, accessed May 23, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/24/grab-uber-deal-southeast-asia/.
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Research Objectives
Although the ridesharing business model was unknown to the world just over a decade ago, the
industry has rapidly developed, and decisions being made today at companies like Uber and
Grab will undoubtedly leave a lasting legacy on the future of transportation. Researchers have
spent the past few years understanding the economics and marketplace dynamics of the
two-sided ridesharing market, but there remains much to be explored when it comes to the
impact of varying market structures on the ride hailing industry. Furthermore, current research
focuses overwhelmingly on the ridesharing industry in the United States, leaving notable gaps in
knowledge when it comes to ride hailing in the rest of the world. Through conducting this
research, I hope to uncover valuable insights regarding how monopoly power in the ride hailing
markets in Asia enables companies to effectively leverage their control for the benefit of drivers
and more successfully pursue profitability through achieving greater economies of scale and
diversification.
This research project focuses on DiDi and Grab not only because they’re two of the biggest ride
hailing companies internationally but also because both have experienced the transition from a
more competitive market to one where they hold the dominant position. Moreover, since both
companies operate in Asia, they are faced with similar regulatory environments and cultural
contexts, which play a huge role in informing corporate-level decisions. These shared
characteristics coupled with the fact that the two companies have a longstanding partnership and
vested interests in each other make DiDi and Grab the ideal companies to investigate and
compare for this research study.3 In fact, in 2017, DiDi and SoftBank Group Corp. collectively
invested US$2 billion in Grab, solidifying the relationship between the two ride hailing giants.4
Despite the regional focus of this research, the findings of this study have broader implications
for both ridesharing companies’ policies and government regulations of ridesharing companies
all around the world. With ride hailing also on the rise in Australia, the MENA region, and Latin
America, gaining insight into the impact of monopolistic ride hailing companies like DiDi and
Grab on drivers will be critical for understanding the potential for greater social impact in the
ridesharing market. Even though rideshare companies are actively engaged in CSR programs and
are committed to ensuring drivers’ earnings and safety, it is nevertheless important to look at
how rideshare companies can do a better job of guaranteeing insurance coverage, earning
opportunities, stable incomes, medical leave, and future job opportunities, among other benefits
3

Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Milestones," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020,
https://www.didiglobal.com/about-special/milestone.
4
Grab, "Grab Announces Didi Chuxing and SoftBank As Lead Investors for Current Round of Financing," Grab,
last modified July 24, 2017, accessed June 4, 2020,
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/business/grab-announces-didi-chuxing-softbank-lead-investors-current-round-financ
ing/.
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for their drivers. Additionally, this research study is relevant for government entities that may be
considering whether or not they need to engage in greater regulation of the ride hailing market;
this research suggests that in the interest of the drivers, government authorities should not break
up monopolies in the rideshare industry but should actively work with them in certain areas in
order to ensure that their market control is leveraged for social impact.
Lastly, by way of exploring the business decisions and social impact of rideshare companies that
operate in a monopolistic market in Asia, this research seeks to forecast and understand the
future of ride hailing in the U.S. Naturally, both Uber and Lyft have aspirations to capture the
entirety of the ridesharing market in America and gain market control so that they can achieve
stronger network effects and profitability.5 While the two companies are still locked into a fierce
price war, it’s unclear if one player will eventually come to monopolize and dominate the
American ride hailing market. If that does happen, DiDi and Grab could serve as useful
projections for what that market might look like for drivers.
Research Methodology
In order to achieve this research goal, this study will look at the circumstances for rideshare
drivers in China and Singapore before and after DiDi and Grab’s mergers with Uber. As
aforementioned, company policies regarding licensure requirements, insurance coverage, pricing,
driver commissions, and CSR programs will serve as the basis for this research. While this
research focuses on understanding the unique changes in the Chinese and Singaporean rideshare
markets, it also looks at them in conjunction and draws conclusions from comparing and
contrasting the two.
This research includes both primary and secondary sources and uses existing scholarly research
on the rideshare industry and on DiDi and Grab in particular as a starting point for understanding
the economics of monopolistic rideshare companies. This is supplemented by an in-depth
examination of DiDi and Grab’s policies and terms and conditions, which help provide insight
into the nature of the contractual relationships drivers enter into when they begin working for
rideshare companies. Additionally, I gathered information from news articles, reports by DiDi
and Grab, and the News and Blog sections of their websites. In order to better understand the
regulatory environments in China and Singapore, I also reviewed government documents that
discuss the mergers and their consequences. The bulk of the research was done through
qualitative interviews with employees at DiDi and Grab as well as labor union representatives,
who added the perspective of rideshare drivers to the research study. While some of the
5

Jeff Spross, "Uber is basically promising investors it will become a monopoly," The Week, last modified April 15,
2019, accessed August 8, 2020,
https://theweek.com/articles/834836/uber-basically-promising-investors-become-monopoly.
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interviewees were comfortable with having their names included in this research paper, most of
the employees who were interviewed preferred to stay anonymous due to the nature of the topic
and its relevance to their work and company. Information from these interviews have been
anonymized and aggregated, and the insights acquired from these interviews are scattered
throughout the paper.
While this research endeavors to provide a full picture of the nature of monopolistic rideshare
markets through looking at DiDi in China and Grab in Singapore, there are several limitations
that are worth mentioning. This research project was originally intended to be conducted in
China and Singapore, where I would have had the chance to interview DiDi and Grab drivers and
hear their opinions. Because of COVID-19, I was unable to travel and instead interviewed people
online. This made it much more difficult to identify and interview drivers, so the perspective of
drivers in this research study is limited to the information I gathered from speaking with labor
union industrial relations officers who represent private hire car drivers and reading news articles
that included driver interviews. One additional limitation to this research is that certain data and
information about DiDi and Grab are not publicly available because both companies are
currently privately held and have yet to IPO.
Background on the Ridesharing Market
This research focuses specifically on the nature of monopolistic rideshare markets. However, this
paper will begin by providing some useful context regarding the economics of the ridesharing
industry before diving into region-specific examples. Ride hailing platforms like Uber, DiDi, and
Grab operate as two-sided markets that experience significant two-sided network effects, which
means that the value for drivers and riders increases as the number of the other increases.6 In
order for a platform to achieve the strongest two-sided network effects, it must continually work
to increase the number of drivers on the platform and then increase the number of riders, and so
on, constantly balancing marketplace supply and demand. Consequently, rideshare companies
tend to do better when they operate in a monopolistic market or when they compete with other
companies but neither the drivers nor the riders engage in multihoming, which refers to the
practice of switching between multiple platforms.7 As such, theoretically monopolistic rideshare
companies that are able to drive users to their platform and make the best use of these network
effects will achieve the highest prices and greatest profits.8 At the same time, however, these
6

Linyan Feng, "DiDi Loses Significant Money on its Rides," EqualOcean, last modified May 2, 2019, accessed June
10, 2020, https://equalocean.com/auto/20190502-didi-losses-significant-money-on-its-rides.
7
Chunchun Liu et al., "Multihoming and oligopolistic platform competition" (unpublished manuscript, National
University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, September 17, 2019), 2, accessed June 26, 2020,
http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/ecsjkdw/multihoming%20and%20platform%20competition%20190917.pdf.
8
Kevin A. Bryan and Joshua S. Gans, "A Theory of Multihoming in Rideshare Competition," Journal of Economics
& Management Strategy 28, no. 1 (2019): 94, https://www.nber.org/papers/w24806.pdf.
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monopolistic rideshare companies may be socially optimal in terms of minimizing wait times for
riders and reducing idling for drivers.9
According to a model created by researchers at the National University of Singapore using real
data on the ridesharing economy in the United States, the entrance of a new player into the ride
hailing market leads to a reduction in both driver earnings and platform profit.10 Additionally, an
increase in multihoming also results in a decrease in platform profit, so rideshare companies are
generally better off when they achieve monopoly control and maintain it by discouraging the
entry of new players.11
Although being a monopoly in the rideshare industry naturally implies that the company
dominates the ride hailing market in that country, the ridesharing industry also competes with
other modes of transportation. For example, rideshare companies view both traditional taxi
companies and public transportation, which operate in slightly different segments of the
transportation industry, as competitors.12 Regardless of how much market share a monopoly
holds in the ride hailing market, the company will still have to provide their service for a low
enough price such that riders won’t opt for other means of transportation.
Independent Contractor vs. Employee Debate
By virtue of being a part of the gig economy, ride hailing companies classify their drivers as
independent contractors and not employees. There is a longstanding debate about whether gig
economy workers should be considered by law to be employees at the companies they work for,
and this has become an increasingly contentious issue in the U.S. and especially in California.13
Traditionally, this relationship is defined in terms of payment method, duration, type of work,
and the amount of control the employer wields over the agent, among other factors.14
Accordingly, rideshare drivers are considered independent contractors and not employees
because they are paid per job instead of by salary and ride hailing companies have no direct
supervision or control over them.15
9

Ibid, 95.
Liu et al., "Multihoming and oligopolistic," 4.
11
Ibid.
12
Arvind Swaminathan, Zoom interview by author, August 3, 2020.
13
Jay Peters and Andrew J. Hawkins, "Uber and Lyft ordered by California judge to classify drivers as employees,"
The Verge, last modified August 10, 2020, accessed August 15, 2020,
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/10/21362460/uber-lyft-drivers-employees-california-court-ruling.
14
Ben Z. Steinberger, "Redefining 'Employee' in the Gig Economy: Shielding Workers from the Uber Model.,"
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 23, no. 2 (2018): 581,
https://search-ebscohost-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=129502056&site=ehost
-live.
15
Ibid, 584.
10
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As the name suggests, independent contractors are afforded greater flexibility and autonomy than
employees, but the other side of the coin is that they lack the security and benefits that are
provided by companies for their employees.16 Rideshare drivers must pay all of their costs (fuel
costs, maintenance costs, not to mention costs associated with purchasing or renting a car) out of
pocket, and they are not entitled to employee benefits like unemployment compensation,
workers’ compensation, health insurance, and employee retirement benefits.17, 18
Because these benefits are not guaranteed for independent contractors, this opens up the
possibility for ride hailing companies to engage in social impact not only for their riders but also
for their drivers. Rideshare companies like DiDi and Grab have taken important steps in recent
years to provide insurance coverage for their drivers and offer drivers some sort of assurance for
their earnings, safety, and future.19 However, much more can be done in the way of protecting
drivers and ensuring their wellbeing in the long term. Interestingly, the independent contractor
versus employee debate is much less heated and disputed in Asia, and key stakeholders have for
the most part shelved this debate so that they can focus on creating a collaborative and
sustainable industry. In any case, this paper will continue to examine how DiDi and Grab, as
rideshare companies with monopolistic market control, have stepped in to provide these benefits
for their drivers as well as where they’ve fallen short of driver needs.
Didi Chuxing
Company Overview
DiDi was first launched in China in 2012 by founder Cheng Wei, although at the time it existed
as two separate companies, DiDi Dache and Kuaidi Dache.20 In 2015, DiDi Dache and Kuaidi
Dache merged, with the combined company taking on the name Didi Chuxing; DiDi controlled
60% of the company due to its higher ride volume.21 In August of the following year, DiDi

16

Stan Malos, Gretchen Vogelgesang Lester, and Meghna Virick, "Uber Drivers and Employment Status in the Gig
Economy: Should Corporate Social Responsibility Tip the Scales?," Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal
30, no. 4 (December 2018): 241, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1007/s10672-018-9325-9.
17
Henry Ross, "Ridesharing's House of Cards: O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. and the Viability of Uber's
Labor Model in Washington," Washington Law Review 90, no. 3 (October 2015): 1432,
https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/docview/176437479
1?accountid=14707.
18
Malos, Lester, and Virick, "Uber Drivers," 240.
19
Arvind Swaminathan, Zoom interview by author, August 3, 2020.
20
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "Milestones," DiDi.
21
Brad Stone and Lulu Yilun Chen, "Uber Slayer: How China's Didi Beat the Ride-Hailing Superpower,"
Bloomberg, last modified October 6, 2016, accessed June 26, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-didi-cheng-wei/.
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acquired Uber China, with Uber taking a 17.7% stake in the company and $1 billion in cash.22
This merger resulted in a combined market share of around 95%, and DiDi continues to
dominate the Chinese ride hailing market today, with over ten billion rides annually.23, 24
Although this merger prompted an investigation by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, DiDi has
yet to receive a ruling four years after the initial merger.25 At present, DiDi is one of the most
highly valued startups in the world, and the company is backed by two of China’s biggest tech
companies, Alibaba and Tencent.26 Besides China, DiDi now operates in eight international
markets, but as aforementioned, this research focuses specifically on DiDi’s operations and
strategy in the Chinese market because of its monopolistic market control there.
Becoming a Driver
In the years since the merger with Uber, becoming a driver for DiDi has become slightly more
difficult. This change was not a direct consequence of the merger but rather a side effect of DiDi
focusing more on driver quality for the long term and the government imposing greater
regulations on the monopoly. Ride hailing is almost always an undersupplied market, and in a
country with close to 1.4 billion people, one of the primary challenges is maintaining a large
enough supply of drivers to meet rider demand.27 For that reason, being too selective with its
driver supply or instituting too many licensure requirements would not serve DiDi well.
However, as the priority has shifted from attracting drivers from competing platforms to
guaranteeing driver quality, the requirements for becoming a driver for DiDi have also become
more onerous to meet. This coupled with the fact that the Chinese government and local
governments are tightening regulations on DiDi means that becoming a driver on the platform
has gradually increased in difficulty.
To begin, there is a fairly high cost of compliance, as prospective drivers must study for and take
an exam and register their vehicle as a commercial vehicle.28 On top of existing maintenance and
insurance fees, the cost that comes with acquiring a commercial car license may render driving
22

Ibid.
 eijing Xiaoju Technology, "About Us," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020,
B
https://www.didiglobal.com/about-didi/about-us.
24
Savannah Dowling, "How Didi Partnered And Burned Its Way To Market Leadership In China," Crunchbase, last
modified May 23, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020,
https://news.crunchbase.com/news/how-didi-partnered-and-burned-its-way-to-market-leadership-in-china/.
25
Yujie Xie, "What Didi's Blackout Exposed About the Ride-Hailing Industry," Sixth Tone, last modified
September 28, 2018, accessed June 9, 2020,
https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1002992/what-didis-blackout-exposed-about-the-ride-hailing-industry.
26
Stone and Chen, "Uber Slayer," Bloomberg.
27
Xinyu Zhang, "How Didi Works," PingWest, last modified August 29, 2017, accessed August 15, 2020,
https://en.pingwest.com/a/112.
28
Rita Liao, "China's Didi adds driver training program to counter sharp decline in rides," TechCrunch, last
modified November 28, 2018, accessed June 4, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2018/11/28/didi-driver-program/.
23
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for DiDi unprofitable for some part time drivers on the platform.29 After acquiring a vehicle
registration license, drivers must also undergo a background check, which DiDi conducts in
collaboration with the Criminal Investigation Department, the Chinese Ministry of Public
Security, and the local police department.30 Due to its two high profile murder cases in 2018,
DiDi ramped up safety measures as well, requiring all drivers to participate in their Compulsory
Online Driver Safety Training Program and take separate driver training modules.31 Furthermore,
drivers are required to complete additional identification checks like daily facial recognitions,
further background checks, and vehicle and driver compliance checks.32 Between the extra cost
and heightened compliance standards, drivers may find it more and more difficult to not only
qualify to drive for DiDi but also stay on the platform. DiDi’s website writes that in 2017, the
year after the merger with Uber, DiDi rejected, on average, 40,000 driver applications each day
because the applicants did not meet the qualification and compliance requirements to become a
driver.33
Beyond these standardized requirements, DiDi has also faced stricter local regulation with
regards to driver onboarding in recent years. In 2016, the Chinese government legalized online
ride hailing companies through the passage of its Interim Measures for the Administration of
Online Car Hiring Business Operations and Services.34 However, local governments have since
passed their own versions of these measures, instituting new and different regulations for drivers
in various cities. For example, in an effort to weed out so-called “black car” drivers (a term that
refers to unlicensed drivers), many cities have added an additional license requirement for
drivers to their local city laws.35 In Beijing and Shanghai, drivers must have a hukou, a
household registration in the city, in order to drive, in effect preventing anyone who traveled to
the city for work from driving for DiDi.36 This double license policy, which was formally
Rita Liao, "The end of China's ridesharing gig," TechCrunch, last modified January 1, 2019, accessed June 22,
2020, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/01/end-of-chinas-ride-sharing-gig/.
30
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Safety," DiDi, accessed June 1, 2020,
https://www.didiglobal.com/science/security.
31
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Resumes Late-Night Ride-Hailing with Enhanced Safety Measures," DiDi, last
modified September 14, 2018, accessed June 3, 2020,
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=542&type=blog.
32
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi China Concludes Safety Revamp with Official Report Submitted to Ministry of
Transport," DiDi, last modified October 24, 2019, accessed June 3, 2020,
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=791&type=blog.
33
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi Resumes," DiDi.
34
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "NDRC investigates implementation of local car-hailing policies and officials call for
stricter review," DiDi, last modified December 17, 2017, accessed June 3, 2020,
https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=337&type=blog.
35
Julie Yujie Chen and Jack Linchuan Qiu, "Digital utility: Datafication, regulation, labor, and DiDi's
platformization of urban transport in China," Chinese Journal of Communication 12, no. 3 (2019): 282,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17544750.2019.1614964.
36
Josh Horowitz, "One year after the Uber-Didi merger, it's only getting harder to hail a ride in China," Quartz, last
modified August 3, 2017, accessed June 21, 2020,
https://qz.com/1045268/one-year-after-the-uber-didi-merger-its-only-getting-harder-to-hail-a-ride-in-china/.
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implemented on January 1st, 2019, mandates that all drivers hold both a commercial vehicle
license and local residency permit in the city they are working.37
These regulations have made it significantly harder for aspiring drivers to start driving for DiDi
and for drivers who are already on the platform to continue, especially if they were previously
driving part time. The new requirements are varied in nature, but they make it both more costly
and more time consuming to get certified as a driver on DiDi. The commercial vehicle license,
test, and newfound safety requirements increase the barrier to driving, and the local adaptations
to the national measures that legalized ride hailing across China have limited the potential driver
pool to a smaller group of people who have residency permits and the money to acquire the
commercial license. While these problems and hurdles to becoming a driver aren’t unique to
DiDi, they are in part brought about by DiDi’s change in focus following the merger and the
increase in government scrutiny that resulted from the exit of Uber from the market.
Insurance Coverage
As DiDi has diversified into financial and insurance services, coverage options for drivers have
increased. Shortly after the double license regulation came into effect in 2019, DiDi moved into
financial technology and insurance, and the company began providing both health and car
insurance for its drivers in an effort to decrease the barrier of entry and compensate for the high
compliance costs.38
In 2015, DiDi first partnered with Ping An Property Insurance to launch its DiDi General
Accident Insurance Plan.39 The general insurance plan automatically applied to all DiDi drivers
and riders at no cost, and it allocated up to CNY 1.2 million per person in the case of injury,
disability, or death resulting from accidents.40 However, it’s unclear if this plan still exists, as
there is no documentation for it on DiDi’s website besides the 2015 article in the News Center,
and articles from 2019 write that DiDi was planning on working with Chinese insurance
companies to launch an accident insurance plan that covers up to CNY 1.2 million.41 While it is
unclear whether DiDi provides general accident insurance for all of its drivers and riders at the
Jon Russell, "Didi launches lending and insurance as new regulation threatens to lower driver numbers,"
TechCrunch, last modified January 2, 2019, accessed July 5, 2020,
https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/01/didi-launches-lending-and-insurance/.
38
Ibid.
39
Beijing Xiaoju Technology, "DiDi pioneers general rideshare insurance program," DiDi, last modified October 26,
2015, accessed June 3, 2020, https://www.didiglobal.com/news/newsDetail?id=298&type=news.
40
Ibid.
41
Reuters Staff, "China's Didi plans to relaunch Hitch service with new safety features," Reuters, last modified July
18, 2019, accessed August 16, 2020,
https://cn.reuters.com/article/china-didi-chuxing/chinas-didi-plans-to-relaunch-hitch-service-with-new-safety-feature
s-idUSL4N24J22I.
37
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moment, DiDi’s website does state that the company offers assistance and aid in the case of
injury or sudden death, though it does not specify a maximum amount.42
As for automobile insurance, DiDi drivers can purchase insurance for their vehicles directly in
the app, which recommends different insurance policies based on drivers’ individual needs.43
DiDi’s diversification into financial services following the merger has made it easier for drivers
to purchase automobile insurance through the app, and this accessibility may be important for
segments of the driver population that have lower financial literacy. However, besides car
insurance, it is difficult to tell whether DiDi also provides commercial vehicle insurance and
accident insurance for its drivers.
Driver Earnings
When DiDi and Uber China first merged in 2016, drivers worried that the exit of Uber from the
market and the establishment of DiDi as the monopoly power in the region would have a strong
negative bearing on their earnings. Many assumed that DiDi would lower fares and increase its
commission rate in order to maximize profit, and drivers were especially concerned about DiDi
cutting their incentives, which at the time made up a significant portion of their income. While
there was a drastic drop in the incentives that were given out to drivers following the merger, the
pricing structure and commission rate has stayed roughly the same. Drivers are also still able to
make a living through driving on the platform because of the heightened demand on the
platform.
Although DiDi does not disclose its pricing mechanism and fare structure because they constitute
valuable intellectual property, DiDi does have upfront fares and dynamic pricing, which helps
balance supply and demand in the market. As is the case for other ride hailing companies, DiDi
operates using a commission model, where the company takes a percentage of the fare for each
trip. Given that DiDi has wielded market control in China since 2016, the company could have
theoretically hiked up its commission rate after Uber left the market. However, DiDi’s platform
commission hasn’t increased dramatically and has actually remained very reasonable. For
reference, in 2016, Uber took at least 25% of driver revenue through its platform commission.44
Based on data from the fourth quarter of 2018, DiDi executive Chen Xi revealed that the
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platform was averaging a commission rate of around 19%.45 Instead of using a steady
commission rate that is applied consistently across rides, DiDi actually takes different percentage
commissions on different rides. This commission ranges from below 15% to above 25%, with
that middle section counting for around 60% of rides (20% of the time, the commission rate will
be below 15% and another 20% of the time, the commission rate will be above 25%).46
Surprisingly, the commission that DiDi gets from its rides is not even sufficient to cover all of its
costs, and over a third of the commission ends up going back towards incentives and subsidies
that benefit the drivers directly.47 In fact, this 19% average commission comes short of
completely covering DiDi’s taxes, fees, operational costs, and driver incentives, so DiDi actually
takes around a 2% loss on every drive.48
While it seems strange that a ride hailing company with over 90% market share cannot even
break even with the revenue it gets from its platform commission, this reality actually highlights
the issue of undersupply in the ride hailing market. Supply management lies at the core of DiDi’s
decision making when it comes to pricing and commissions, and the imbalance between supply
and demand in the ridesharing market represents a severe constraint on the company. Even
though DiDi acquired Uber and presently controls the market, it must sustain a large enough
supply of drivers to meet market demand. As such, DiDi is unable to use its monopoly power to
exploit its drivers and maximize profit, and the commission rates are generally low enough for
drivers to continue to earn their livelihoods on the platform. In 2017, DiDi drivers earned an
average of CNY 160 each day, and DiDi’s Report on Job Creation in Restructuring Industries
reported that over three quarters of DiDi drivers were able to make at least as much as they did
during their previous job by driving on the platform.49, 50 In addition, over 1.3 million DiDi
drivers were the sole earners for their families.51 While CNY 160 is by no means a lot of money,
DiDi has taken care to maintain its fares and commission rates at a level that allows those who
drive full time on the platform to make a living through the job. DiDi’s platform commission
remains fairly reasonable, and DiDi has chosen to pay for certain costs itself instead of raising its
commission rates.
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Incentives and Subsidies
Ride hailing companies in oligopolistic markets around the world spend large amounts of money
on driver incentives in order to both attract drivers to the platform and keep them on the
platform. Ride hailing companies that operate in markets without much competition do not avoid
this problem entirely, but they can spend much less on driver incentives because they can employ
other mechanisms to get drivers to sign up for their platform. Drivers saw a significant decrease
in incentives following both the merger with Kuaidi Dache in 2015 and the merger with Uber in
2016, but driver earnings have since rebounded and stabilized given the overwhelming demand
in the market. Although the initial decline in subsidies hurt driver earnings, the increase in
demand on DiDi following the mergers in part compensated for this original decrease, and
drivers have been able to achieve a steady income.
During its first two years, Didi Dache competed aggressively with Kuaidi Dache, and both
companies gave out substantial subsidies to drivers to convince them to drive for their platform.52
Because traditional taxis had already existed for a long time in the markets that ride hailing
platforms were trying to break into, rideshare companies charged lower fares than traditional
cabs so that people would choose to take Didi Dache or Kuaidi Dache over a taxi.53 However,
due to the two-sided nature of the market, rideshare companies also had to supplement driver
earnings with incentives so that they could maintain an adequate supply for their demand. As
such, Chinese ride hailing companies had always used an incentive pay system to convince
drivers to drive, and these incentives became the primary way that rideshare platforms competed
with each other for drivers and market share.54
When Uber first entered the Chinese market, Uber and DiDi engaged in a price war by pushing
down and subsidizing fares for riders.55 At the same time, they competed for the same driver pool
by giving their drivers substantial incentives. During this time, the two companies were each
spending over a billion dollars every year to get riders and drivers on their platform, and Uber
suffered more than 2 billion dollars in losses.56, 57 One type of subsidy that DiDi offered was an
extra payment that was given to drivers who drove more than a set number of rides in a
week-long period; at times, this subsidy amounted to more than the total fare that passengers
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were paying for that ride.58 Because of incentives like these, some drivers experienced a
pronounced decrease in their earnings following the DiDi Uber merger. In 2015, some drivers
were earning CNY 10,000 each month, but in April of 2018, drivers earnings were only around
CNY 6,000 to CNY 7,000 yuan, a 30% to 40% decrease from before.59 As a result, drivers were
often working 16 to 17 hours a day to get more rides and increase their incomes.60 Most recently,
in 2018, DiDi competed with Meituan-backed Shouqi Yueche and spent around $1.7 billion on
various subsidies and discounts.61
Even after its merger with Kuaidi in 2015, DiDi had only captured around 55% percent of the
market share of the ride hailing industry in China.62 As this percentage has risen to over 95%, the
market has also experienced several rounds of price wars with different competitors. Although
DiDi no longer spends as prodigiously on driver incentives and rider subsidies as during its days
of competing with Kuaidi, Uber, and Shouqi Yueche, it has also not stopped giving drivers
incentives altogether and is reported to spend around $4 billion annually on subsidies for riders
and incentives for drivers combined.63 While this spending alone is not enough to compensate for
drivers’ losses in incomes following the mergers and exits of different players from the market,
the demand for DiDi has also increased dramatically with the market share. Given that DiDi is
now the dominant player in the Chinese ride hailing market by a mile, almost all riders use DiDi.
Over time, as riders have migrated from using other platforms to using DiDi, driver earnings
have also restabilized. Although drivers from other platforms also switched to driving for DiDi,
the amount by which demand has grown on DiDi far outstrips the amount by which supply has
grown. Consequently, with the current level of incentives and the large amount of demand for
the service, DiDi drivers’ earnings have naturally reached a stable point.
KPI-Based Management
During the years that DiDi was competing with Uber, DiDi gave out incentives to drivers across
the board because the goal was to enlarge the diver pool and outcompete Uber by getting any and
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all drivers onto the DiDi platform. However, with Uber exiting the market, DiDi was able to shift
its attention toward driver quality and rider experience, and the company has since implemented
a number of new KPI-based management tactics. Besides tightening the requirements for
becoming a driver, DiDi has also grown more strict about driver ratings and cancellation ratings
and will deactivate a driver’s account if his/her average rating falls below 4.5 stars, if their
cancellation rating jumps too high, or if the driver commits a serious traffic violation.64
Furthermore, DiDi guarantees driver compliance with regulations by utilizing periodic checks by
DiDi staff who pretend to be normal passengers; in cases where drivers fail this check, their
accounts may also become deactivated.65
Beyond controlling for the quality of drivers who actively drive for the platform, in late 2016,
DiDi also began assigning rides based on certain metrics. DiDi’s intelligent ride-matching
algorithm uses the company’s Service Credit Score system in order to determine which drivers
are assigned which rides, with drivers with higher scores receiving more favorable rides.66 The
Service Credit Scores are a comprehensive measure of a driver’s service quality and take into
account not only response time and pickup time but also in-trip services and post-ride services.67
This ride-matching system allows DiDi to differentiate between its drivers and directly reward
higher-performing drivers by giving them better rides that generate more income. As DiDi has
gained more market share, the company has also begun prioritizing driver quality and brand
image. Consequently, DiDi not only tracks key metrics (service quality, cancellation rating,
driver rating, etc.) for its drivers but also makes decisions regarding account deactivation and
ride assignment based off of them.
Social Impact and Corporate Social Responsibility
As a platform with such a large user base, DiDi has also used its position and resources for the
social impact of its drivers and riders, as well as the community at large. To begin, over 5 million
DiDi drivers came from Chinese industries that face overcapacity, and they’ve found a way to
earn their livelihoods through driving for the platform.68 DiDi has also rolled out several CSR
initiatives, including the DiDi Driver Foundation, which provides financial aid to drivers’
families in need, and the DiDi Cares Foundation, which works with research institutes and
universities to conduct and publish research on driver health. Both of these foundations were
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established in late 2016, and DiDi has continued to devote money and resources to them in the
years after.69 Although DiDi’s focus during its first four years was primarily on defeating its
competitors, with its position solidified in 2016, DiDi has fully dedicated itself to leveraging its
platform and capabilities to improve not only operational efficiency and driver income but also
social impact and safety.
Grab
Company Overview
Grab was founded in Malaysia in June of 2012 by Anthony Tan and Tan Hooi Ling, and the
company originated because the co-founders wanted to provide a safe mode of transportation for
people in Southeast Asia.70 Currently, Grab is headquartered in Singapore and operates in eight
countries in the region, and it competes aggressively with Gojek in several of these markets,
especially Indonesia. In 2018, Grab seized control of the Singaporean ride hailing market after
acquiring Uber Southeast Asia; as a result of that deal, Uber took a 27.5% stake in Grab.71
Even though Grab exists in several different markets across the Southeast Asian region, the
company takes a hyperlocal approach to each market and caters its product to the differing needs
and dynamics of the markets.72 Instead of making broad generalizations about Grab’s strategy
and operations in the region at large, this section of the paper looks solely at Grab’s past and
current situations in Singapore, a market where Grab is the dominant player. Although Gojek
also operates in Singapore, it has a much smaller market share than Grab, and the Competition
and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS) estimates that post-merger, Grab holds
between 80% and 90% market share in the ride hailing market in Singapore.73 As a result, Grab
does have, to a large degree, monopoly control over the Singaporean ridesharing industry.
As a small city-state, Singapore has an extraordinarily well-developed public transport system
but is also uniquely suited for rideshare. For one, the high taxes, congestion charges, and
Certificate of Entitlement (COE) make it tremendously expensive to own a car there.74 The COE,
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an additional fee on top of the price of the vehicle, can cost up to S$50,000 and is subject to
renewal after 10 years, at which point the car owner either sells or scraps the car.75 This
regulation makes rideshare a convenient alternative to buying and driving your own car and
subsequently a highly demanded service.
Unlike DiDi, which never received a ruling regarding its merger with Uber China, Grab was
fined after its merger with Uber’s Southeast Asia business and has since been subject to
regulations imposed by the CCCS, the competition watchdog in Singapore. When news of the
Grab Uber deal first broke out, the CCCS expressed concerns about the acquisition violating
Section 54 of Singapore’s Competition Act.76 The CCCS found that the merger led to a
substantial decrease in competition in the ridesharing industry and that the combined market
share of 80% to 90%, which is far greater than their threshold of 40%, constituted sufficient
cause for intervention.77 After the merger, the CCCS passed its Infringement Decision, and this
decision stipulated, among other things, that Grab pay a S$13 million fine and end its exclusive
arrangements with taxi companies, which previously gave Grab unique access to the fleets and
drivers of Trans-Cab, Silver Cab, and Premier Taxis.78, 79 Moreover, in keeping with the CCCS’
objective of ensuring competition, the decision required that Grab maintain its prior pricing and
commission rates and not change them from where they were before March 26, 2018, the date of
the Grab Uber announcement.80
In response to the CCCS decision, the Head of Grab Singapore Lim Kell Jay stated that
“Competition exists. This week, two companies have already come out to say that they are going
to launch their ride-hailing apps in Singapore and elsewhere in the region. And that’s just in
ride-hailing. Passengers continue to have many other transport choices. They can book taxis via
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taxi apps, take street-hail taxis, car-pool, take public trains and buses, anything.”81 However, the
CCCS noted that the entrance of a few small ride hailing apps into the market does not constitute
significant competition because Grab still holds an overwhelming majority of the market share
and that it’s difficult to break into the rideshare industry because of the network effects and high
barriers to entry.82
Becoming a Driver
Due to the litany of licensure requirements laid out by Singaporean law, the process for
becoming a driver for Grab in Singapore is both time-consuming and expensive. While some
drivers choose to drive for Grab with a rental car, other drivers will purchase their own car.
Although the high costs and COE associated with buying a car in Singapore make rideshare a
highly sought-after service in that market, they also mean that operating costs for drivers are
enormously high. After acquiring or renting a car, drivers must study for and take a written exam
as well as undergo a medical screening and a thorough background check.83 Before 2018, a lot of
the drivers who did not pass the background check for Grab ended up driving for either Gojek or
Uber.84 Following the merger, drivers from other platforms came back to Grab, but many drivers
who did not meet the safety requirements for the background check the first time around were
never onboarded onto the app because Grab had taken a strong stance regarding safety
requirements and driver quality.85
Singaporean law further requires that rideshare drivers obtain either a Taxi Driver's Vocational
Licence (TDVL) or a Private Hire Car Driver's Vocational Licence (PDVL), which drivers can
apply for after they’ve held their driver’s license for at least two years.86 Beyond proving that
they’ve had their driver’s license for over two years, applicants must also provide their National
Registration Identity Card (NRIC) and proof of commercial insurance for their vehicle.87
Moreover, applicants must pay a S$100 fee to convert their vehicle to Z10/Z11 classification in
accordance with the requirements laid out by the Land Transport Authority (LTA).88
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Given that this process is quite cumbersome, Grab has made an effort to facilitate the onboarding
process and invested S$10 million in GrabCar in 2017 to cover the fees (application, medical
exam, training, and test fees) for acquiring a PDVL.89 Grab also partnered with the Singapore
Taxi Academy (STA) to launch ExpressOne, which helps drivers obtain their PDVL by offering
training sessions, free coaching, reimbursement for costs, and test registration for English
language certification exams.90 Evidently, a lot of these requirements for becoming a Grab driver
are not determined by Grab but rather by the Singaporean government, so there are not many
notable changes from before the merger to after the merger. However, it is interesting to note that
following the merger, one of the biggest challenges that Grab encountered was actually moving
drivers to the platform.91 In Singapore, the government regulations made signing up to be a
driver for Grab a tedious and time intensive process, so it took a lot of time to migrate drivers
from Uber over to Grab.
Insurance Coverage
Because Grab was founded with the intention of guaranteeing safe transportation in Southeast
Asia, insurance coverage has been a priority for the company since relatively early on. In fact,
Grab was the first ride hailing company to provide its drivers and riders with insurance
protection above the required commercial auto insurance.92 In March of 2016, Grab first released
its free Personal Accident Insurance policy, which covers all drivers and riders at no cost in the
case of accidental death (within 12 months of the accident), permanent disability, or injury.93 At
the time, the maximum insurance coverage for drivers and riders from this policy was $250,000
per vehicle.94 In cases where multiple vehicles were involved in the accident, the insurance could
pay up to $2.5 million for a given accident.95 Now, according to Grab’s website, the Group
Personal Accident Insurance that all drivers and riders get free of charge provides up to $13,500
of coverage for medical expenses, disability, and death that result from accidents that happen

Grab, "Grab Announces $10 Million Investment in Singapore for GrabCar," Grab, last modified March 9, 2017,
accessed July 3, 2020,
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/consumers-drivers/grab-announces-10-million-investment-singapore-grabcar/.
90
Grab, "Grab teams up with the Singapore Taxi Academy to help all drivers earn an income as licensed
chauffeurs," Grab, last modified January 24, 2018, accessed June 5, 2020,
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/consumers-drivers/grab-teams-up-with-the-singapore-taxi-academy-to-help-all-drive
rs-earn-an-income-as-licensed-chauffeurs/.
91
Anonymous Grab employee #4, Zoom interview by author, July 30, 2020.
92
Grab, "Trust & Safety," Grab, accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.grab.com/sg/safety/.
93
Grab, "Grab Provides Free Personal Accident Insurance for Passengers and Drivers," Grab, last modified March 3,
2016, accessed June 4, 2020,
https://www.grab.com/sg/press/social-impact-safety/grab-provides-free-personal-accident-insurance-for-passengersand-drivers-2/.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
89

21
during a Grab trip.96 While this is still a large amount of money for Grab to be covering under its
free accident insurance, this new maximum for insurance coverage under Grab’s free accident
insurance policy seems to be substantially less than what it was when the insurance was first
rolled out. In early 2018, Grab, like DiDi, diversified and moved into the financial services
industry, and this drop in coverage amount under the free accident insurance may very well be a
move that encourages drivers and riders to purchase additional insurance plans on top of Grab’s
free one. For example, the Personal Accident Plus insurance covers all of the same circumstances
(accidental death, permanent disability, burns, and medical expenses) as the Group Personal
Accident Insurance, but it goes beyond to free policy to cover the user at all times so that he/she
is protected even when he/she is not driving for Grab.97 The plan operates on a monthly premium
model, where users pay a set amount (ranging from $3.50 to $31) each month according to the
plan that they’ve chosen.98
Besides Group Personal Accident Insurance (and Personal Accident Plus), Grab users also have
access to Prolonged Medical Leave (and Prolonged Medical Leave Plus), Auto Excess, and
Critical Illness Insurance. Prolonged Medical Leave is made available to all Grab drivers in the
Emerald Circle, a tier-based program that drivers qualify for by accumulating enough points
through driving and maintaining a high enough average driver rating.99 The plan pays out a set
percentage of the driver’s earnings in the last 90 days to the driver during their medical leave or
hospitalization and ensures that they still have a source of income during those times.100 Like the
Personal Accident Plus insurance, the Prolonged Medical Leave Plus insurance operates based
on a monthly premium for drivers and covers not just earnings from Grab but also earnings from
other income sources.101 While the Personal Accident Insurance and Prolonged Medical Leave
Insurance are both provided to drivers free of charge, drivers can also choose to purchase Auto
Excess Insurance and Critical Illness: Pay Per Trip (CIPPT) Insurance, which work in similar
ways through daily or per trip premiums.102
Evidently, Grab offers many more types of insurance to its drivers than is standard in the ride
hailing industry, and it is able to do so in part because of the market control it wields and in part
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because the company itself has expanded into the financial service industry in the last two years.
103
As a company with a large driver base, Grab is able to provide drivers with a cheap form of
insurance because the insurance companies with whom it partners (Chubb, NTUC Income, etc.)
give Grab preferential rates to access its driver pool. Moreover, given that these insurance
companies give Grab much more reasonable insurance rates than the actual insurance market,
Grab is then able to tailor these insurance policies to its drivers and launch programs like
micro-insurance, which is a lot easier for drivers to purchase than insurance that require one-time
payment.104 When Grab set out to create these insurance programs for its drivers, it was because
the company saw a gap in insurance protection and a pain point that they could help address. In
fact, the Prolonged Medical Leave Insurance program was created through a partnership with the
National Private Hire Vehicles Association (NPHVA), which illustrates Grab’s attention to its
drivers’ demands and dedication to using its industry dominance for social good.105
As a whole, Grab operated at a large enough scale such that it could work with insurance
partners to provide coverage for drivers at an equitable rate. Given that many drivers in the
region are not well-versed when it comes to financial services and insurance and likely did not
have accident insurance prior to Grab’s Personal Accident Insurance, they would have
encountered significant financial hardships if they had been in an accident. In the past few years,
Grab has taken care to pay attention to drivers’ needs and pain points, and with its market control
and large driver base, Grab has had the ability to provide drivers with different types of
insurance at a more cost effective rate.106
Driver Earnings
Because the CCCS fixed Grab’s fare structure and commission rate to where it was prior to the
merger, driver earnings in Singapore have for the most part stayed the same. Although Grab is
currently unable to change its pricing structure due to government regulation, Head of Grab
Singapore Lim Kell Jay remarked that Grab would not increase its fares even if the regulation
did not exist.107 Prior to the merger, Grab had made two significant changes to its fares, although
the structure (pricing based on a base fare, per kilometer rate, and per minute rate) has stayed the
same. In 2016, Grab adjusted its fares such that the base fare decreased by S$0.50 from S$3.50
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to S$3.00 and the per kilometer rate decreased by S$0.10 from S$0.90 to S$0.80.108 Even with
this decrease in fares, in 2017, Grab drivers in Singapore earned an average hourly wage that was
10% higher than the average wage in the country.109 In January of 2018, Grab again decreased its
base fare by S$0.50, and the fares have since stayed the same at a base fare of $2.50, a per
kilometer rate of S$0.50, and a per minute rate of S$0.16.110 As of late 2018, Grab drivers could
expect to earn an average wage of around S$25 per hour during non-peak hours and S$30 per
hour during peak hours.111 Throughout this time, the commission rate has stayed the same, with
Grab taking at most a 20% commission from each ride.112 This rate is consistent with the industry
average in other rideshare markets around the world.
When Grab first decreased its fares in 2016, drivers expressed their dissatisfaction and
complained that the lower fares made it more difficult for them to earn a living through driving.
However, Grab’s motivation for reducing fares at the time was so that it could increase demand
and strike a better balance between marketplace supply and demand. Lim Kell Jay explained that
“A top priority is our driver partners and we expect this fare revision to attract even more
GrabCar passengers. This is part of a larger, holistic drivers’ programme to increase their net
incomes in a sustainable way.”113 In a two-sided market where customers want to pay lower fares
for their rides while drivers want to earn more money per ride, the economics are much more
focused on the long term than on a single ride. Although drivers were receiving less money from
individual transactions following the decrease in fares, Grab was tapping into the two-sided
network effects in the market by lowering prices so that more customers would use the service.114
Each time Grab lowered its prices, it was in an effort to grow demand in a healthy way so that
drivers benefit.115 And if these changes succeeded in encouraging more riders not just to try Grab
but to stay with it and use it consistently for the future, then driver earnings would gradually
increase in the long run.
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Even though Grab’s pricing structure and commission rate stayed the same after the merger, the
CCCS declared that effective fares increased by between 10% and 15% after the deal.116 Grab
maintained that it did not increase its fares, but this discrepancy likely exists because the CCCS
measures effective fares as the amount that riders pay after any subsidies or discounts while Grab
considers its fares to be the amount before the discount.117 In any case, Grab’s pricing structure
remained exactly the same after March 2018 as per the Infringement Decision released by the
CCCS.
Incentives and Subsidies
Grab drivers responded to the Grab Uber merger in 2018 similarly to how DiDi drivers reacted to
the DiDi Uber merger in 2016, as many drivers voiced their concerns about Grab reducing its
incentives after acquiring Uber.118 Drivers complained that the changes in incentive payouts
following the merger made it difficult to accurately predict and gage their income levels, and
drivers took to social media platforms like Facebook to express their worries.119
While there was a significant dip in incentives as Grab began to phase out of giving drivers so
many incentives, the new demand that arrived on the platform after Uber exited the market made
up for the reduction in incentives. After the merger, demand for Grab services far outstripped the
supply, with the lengthy process for new drivers to get onboarded onto the platform exacerbating
this imbalance.120 As such, driver earnings were not as heavily impacted by the decrease in
incentives as some drivers had anticipated simply because there were so many jobs for drivers to
take.121 In fact, driver utilization, which refers to the proportion of time a driver spends fulfilling
rides out of all the time that they spend on the Grab app, soared to the highest it has ever been.122
Because the supply side of the market is just as important if not more important than the demand
side, Grab obviously does not want to see its driver earnings tank.123 The company has to keep
earnings at a certain level in order to ensure that drivers want to drive for the Grab platform. This
meant that even though Grab was decreasing its incentives, it still rigorously tracked driver
earnings so as to make sure that drivers were still making enough money through working on the
platform.
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When Grab was competing with Uber, it gave out driver incentives in an unsustainable way, and
the company was quickly burning through investor money. Grab rolled out different incentive
programs each week, and the incentive schemes were constantly changing based on the market
because the company had to have enough supply to fulfill demand at all times.124 At times,
drivers would earn up to S$1,500 to S$2,000 a week purely from incentives, and the incentives
would count for up to 40% to 50% of the drivers’ income.125
After Grab acquired Uber and attained greater market control in the region, it focused its
attention on achieving greater profitability, which meant phasing out of unsustainable incentive
programs that were popular pre-merger and redesigning incentive structures for the future.126
Since 2018, there has been a larger emphasis on guaranteeing that drivers’ incomes are stable
and encouraging drivers to work consistently on the platform.127 For example, instead of giving
out a lot of per trip incentives that benefit drivers for every ride they complete, Grab now has
more streak-based incentives and average fare guarantees, which promise drivers a certain
amount of money if they consistently drive for Grab or if they are able to complete a set number
of rides.128 One example is Grab’s Super Steady Streak incentive, which rewards drivers who
have driven over 200 trips per month over several consecutive months.129 Moreover, if drivers
are on Auto Accept, they will qualify for certain incentives.130 In short, the incentive schemes
have pivoted away from large, unsustainable subsidies for drivers and toward more carefully
calculated benefits that encourage drivers to work consistently for Grab.
Two years after the merger first took place, the marketplace is well-balanced enough such that
incentives only constitute a small portion of drivers’ earnings and income.131 Rather than
depending on incentives to make a living on the platform, as was the case when Grab was
competing with Uber, drivers are increasingly viewing incentives as more of an extra bonus that
motivates them to take more trips or drive more frequently on the app. Lastly, despite the
reduction in incentives since the merger with Uber, driver happiness has generally been
improving, which suggests that Grab has done a good job of satisfying drivers’ needs and
ensuring their incomes in the years since.132
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KPI-Based Management
Although Grab did not have the option of selectively giving out its incentives while it was
competing with Uber, Grab now has a robust KPI-based system for rewarding drivers. This
system has helped Grab pursue higher driver quality and rider safety in the past few years, and
the platform has been able to motivate drivers to engage in certain positive behaviors (ie. not
cancelling rides, cleaning up their car, treating their passengers kindly) using its incentives. Grab
bases its incentives off of a driver’s Acceptance Rating (AR), Driver Rating (DR), and
Cancellation Rating (CR), and drivers with the highest acceptance and driver ratings and lowest
cancellation rates qualify for the best incentives.133 Furthermore, drivers get access to certain
rebates based on their service ratings and the number of rides that they’ve fulfilled.134
Additionally, the existence of these ratings as well as other key metrics allows Grab to segment
its driver pool and target specific groups of drivers with its incentives. For one, Grab is able to
much more easily differentiate between its part-time and full-time drivers.135 As a result, when
Grab makes a decision about a new incentive scheme, it is in a position where it can decide
whether the incentive should benefit all of the drivers or just the full-time drivers.136 With Uber
out of the market, Grab’s motivation for giving drivers incentives is not to win a price war but
rather to target and reward a segment of its drivers.137 Specifically, many of these incentives are
targeted for high-performing, full-time drivers because Grab wants to establish healthy long-term
relationships with them, and it’s a conscious decision for Grab to be rewarding the drivers who
work longer hours and are more consistent on the app. However, as a result of these targeted
incentive schemes, Grab has also seen its driver base churn, with some of the part-time drivers
leaving the platform.138
This KPI-based system extends beyond incentives as well. In Singapore, Grab is very strict about
driver quality because the company is looking to build long-term sustainability and its brand
image. As such, if a driver’s cancellation rating is too high or a driver’s acceptance rating is too
low, Grab will ban them from the platform.139 This ability to heavily control for driver quality is
a key difference between a market where there are other competitors and a market where Grab is
the monopoly. 140 If Grab were still competing with other rideshare platforms, the company
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would have neither the liberty to target incentives to certain segments of the driver population
nor the privilege to ban drivers who do not meet its standards from the platform.
Social Impact and Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has always been at the core of Grab’s mission, and the
resources and capabilities that came with acquiring market control in Singapore have enabled
Grab to better serve the country and its drivers. To date, Grab has hosted digital literacy clinics
for over 3,000 senior citizens in Singapore.141 Moreover, the company has provided safety
training for over 1.4 million drivers across all of its markets, and 429,000 drivers have also been
trained to report human trafficking.142 During Covid-19, Grab worked with the Singaporean
government to whitelist around 2,000 drivers to transport healthcare workers to and from
hospitals and around 2,000 more drivers to transport people for Covid testing purposes.143
Besides engaging in social impact for the broader community, Grab has also launched programs
that are designed to help Grab drivers. Within Grab, there is a driver experience team dedicated
to improving driver earnings and increasing drivers’ income sources beyond driving on the
platform.144 Furthermore, Grab as a whole pays a lot of attention to driver needs, and in
Singapore, drivers can speak with Grab employees about their concerns and demands at a
predetermined location every Thursday.145 In addition, Grab works closely with labor unions like
the National Private Hire Vehicles Association (NPHVA) to understand drivers’ pain points;
both the MediSave co-contribution program and Grab’s Prolonged Medical Leave Insurance
were created because of Grab’s partnership with the NPHVA.146
Each time Grab gets rid of one of its incentive programs to rebalance marketplace supply and
demand, it endeavors to make up for it by introducing some sort of benefit or program that would
help the drivers in a different, nonmonetary way.147 For instance, Grab has training programs that
teach drivers the skills that they might need to move into a different industry.148 As a company,
Grab is easily able to reach out into its network and develop partnerships with training institutes,
and Grab has stepped in to fill this need because it recognizes that drivers want to improve
themselves and that it has the ability to help them. Throughout the years, Grab has also provided
drivers with fuel discounts, subsidized mobile subscription plans, and education scholarships for
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drivers’ children.149 Although each one of these benefits goes beyond Grab’s core business and
responsibility as a ride hailing company, Grab has nevertheless chosen to help its drivers by
investing its time, money, and resources into these services. This seems counterintuitive to a
monopoly’s profit-maximizing tendencies, but Grab has been firm in its commitment to helping
its drivers, and the market power and influence that Grab now holds have enabled the company
to fully pursue social impact on top of its daily operations.
Findings
Having described in-depth DiDi and Grab’s respective policies towards and treatment of their
drivers, this paper will next discuss several key findings regarding the nature of monopolistic
rideshare companies. This section of the paper will first elaborate on four central findings before
moving on to present recommendations for both rideshare companies and government entities.
To begin, contrary to drivers’ assumptions that their incomes would decrease significantly
following a merger or acquisition in the industry, the overwhelming demand in the market keeps
their earnings at a relatively steady level. By nature, the ride hailing market is an undersupplied
market because as long as people need to travel from one place to another, they will continue to
demand ridesharing services. On the other hand, by virtue of rideshare being a part of the gig
economy, the driver pool changes from hour to hour, day to day, and week to week. Even if
drivers are consistent with the times that they are driving, they are rarely consistent with where
they are picking up and dropping off rides, which creates even more variability in the supply. As
a result, when all of the supply and demand exists on one singular platform, as is the case with a
monopolistic rideshare market, drivers will have enough jobs to keep their earnings stable. When
DiDi and Uber China merged in 2016 and Grab and Uber Southeast Asia merged in 2018,
drivers in China and Singapore worried that their earnings would decrease when Uber exited the
market and the price war ended. Although the two mergers did substantially reduce the amount
of incentives that DiDi and Grab gave out to the drivers, driver incomes did not suffer
dramatically following the mergers because all of the demand migrated so quickly to the
platform.
Secondly, monopolistic rideshare companies are interested in retaining their drivers for the long
run and will act to keep these drivers on their platform so that they can continue to make use of
the two-sided network effects that are present in the market. As a result, even though many
drivers expected not just incentives but also fares to decrease, prices actually remained relatively
stable and commission rates did not change. In most cases, ride hailing companies decrease their
fares because they want to balance supply and demand and there are not many other mechanisms
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that they can use to do so. However, when a rideshare company has attained sufficient market
share in a market, decreasing fares as a means of stabilizing marketplace economics becomes
fairly ineffective, so there is no motivation for the company to continually change its pricing
structure. At the same time, monopolies in the rideshare industry are hesitant to increase their
commission rates because they do not want the large group of drivers they have finally gotten
onto their platform to churn. Moreover, the ride hailing industry is interesting in that monopolies
in the market still heavily compete with other modes of transportation, including traditional taxis
and public transportation. Even though these competitors do not compete with companies like
DiDi and Grab directly in the same market, they nevertheless constrain certain business decisions
that ride hailing companies make. Most notably, ride hailing monopolies in markets with robust
public transportation systems are unable to significantly increase their prices because they will
lose most of their demand.
While the first two findings deal with how, contrary to existing assumptions and expectations,
certain circumstances within the ride hailing market stay the same even after a merger, the next
two findings consider how monopoly power in the rideshare industry changes corporate strategy
in a way that benefits drivers. When a ride hailing company has obtained monopolistic market
control of a market, that company is able to leverage its market position to engage in greater
social impact and corporate social responsibility. During a price war with its competitors,
ridesharing companies typically devote most of their resources to fighting the battle on the
ground through large incentives and discounts that are subsidized by the company. This is not to
say that these companies do not partake in CSR but rather that their resources to do so are
limited. Once a company has undergone an M&A that gives it monopoly control over the
market, the company is able to redivert a portion of its time and money toward programs that
help benefit the drivers and the community. Although some would argue that monopolistic
companies would not spend on social impact initiatives because they are not directly profitable,
DiDi and Grab illustrate that it is in the best interest of the company to both establish a positive
brand image in the market and engage in initiatives that will help its drivers and prevent churn.
Furthermore, this market position enables these companies to establish more effective
partnerships and programs for the sake of social impact.
Lastly, for DiDi and Grab, acquiring monopolistic market control in the rideshare industry
helped kickstart and propel their diversification into other industries, which include food
delivery, mobile e-payments, financial services, hotel reservations, and ticket booking.150 This
horizontal diversification strategy has proved instrumental in carrying both companies through
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Covid-19, during which the transportation industry mostly came to a halt. With its core ride
hailing business consolidated and solidified, monopolistic ridesharing companies are able to
engage in greater diversification and make use of new synergies. Furthermore, given their hold
on the ride hailing industry, monopolistic rideshare companies can utilize their scale and reach in
the market to provide other key services that are demanded by their driver base. With DiDi and
Grab both moving into the financial services industry, drivers had greater access to different
insurance policies and coverage options at a price that was much lower than in the general
market. However, it is possible that once rideshare companies start providing drivers with
insurance coverage, they would begin to view insurance as less of a benefit that all drivers
deserve and more of an avenue towards greater profitability, as illustrated by the decline in
maximum coverage under Grab’s Free Personal Accident Insurance. Regardless, this
diversification creates new opportunities for drivers to earn their incomes through different ways.
Rideshare companies are thus able to direct their energy and resources toward augmenting their
ecosystem, allowing for new synergies between industries to emerge.
Although both DiDi and Grab have done a good job of taking care of their drivers, this research
paper presents several recommendations for places upon which they can improve. Since the two
companies have devoted so much time and money to launching initiatives like free accident
insurance, training programs, critical illness micro-insurance, and financial aid for drivers’
families, they should now direct their attention to increasing awareness of these programs so that
more drivers can benefit from them. Some of these programs have grown popular among the
drivers, but DiDi and Grab should consider bolstering their marketing efforts of these programs
to their drivers so that they reach a larger segment of their target audience. In addition, given that
it was both time-consuming and cumbersome for drivers to migrate to DiDi or Grab after Uber
exited the market, DiDi and Grab may want to evaluate their current onboarding process and
work with government officials to streamline the process. Naturally, licensure requirements for
becoming a driver are largely dictated by the government, but it may nevertheless be worthwhile
to conduct an assessment of the process. One final note is that while DiDi and Grab have helped
provide certain forms of insurance for their drivers, this protection is still far from enough,
especially in times of difficulty like Covid-19. In the past few months, the government has
stepped in to protect drivers in these two countries. Since DiDi and Grab have both diversified
into financial services and insurance, the two companies could further invest in their finance
groups in an effort to expand their range of offerings for drivers.
The findings from this paper suggest that in the rideshare industry, monopolies may well be more
responsible to its drivers and more socially optimal than duopolies or oligopolies. Because DiDi
and Grab have become much more focused on brand image, sustainability, and supply
management for the long run after their mergers, governments in countries with multiple
competitors in the ride hailing market should not seek to block mergers and acquisitions that
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could potentially form monopolies in the industry. Instead, they should actively work with the
players in the market so that in the case where a singular rideshare company becomes the
monopoly, they will be able to collaborate for the benefit of the drivers and the community. This
also suggests that in the U.S., rather than so strongly fighting Uber and Lyft, the government
should begin building a more cooperative relationship with the two companies. If one of them
eventually comes to take over the other and dominate the market, the government would be in a
good position to partner with them to address driver needs and increase social impact initiatives.
Even if that does not happen in the near future, it is nonetheless important to establish a solid
relationship so that the government can increasingly point the companies towards greater social
impact, in the same way that the Singaporean and Chinese governments have done so for Grab
and DiDi.
Conclusion
In closing, the market structure of a ride hailing industry has a notable bearing on the companies
that operate within it. In investigating both how DiDi and Grab have changed from before their
mergers to now and how the two monopolistic rideshare companies differ from other ride hailing
platforms around the world, it has become obvious that a M&A in the rideshare industry
significantly impacts corporate strategy and decision making. These changes in pricing policies,
insurance coverage, driver incentives, and CSR initiatives have a significant impact on the driver
experience.
This paper looks at DiDi in China and Grab in Singapore as examples of ride hailing companies
that have captured most of the market share in their countries and presently wield monopolistic
market control over the industry. While this comparative study of the two is limited in scope, it
nevertheless provides a starting point for gaining a better understanding of not just the rideshare
industry outside of the U.S. but also the impact of different market structures in the industry on
drivers. This research finds that in the cases of DiDi and Grab, monopolies in the ridesharing
space may in fact be more efficient and socially optimal because they leverage available
resources and market power for diversification as well as greater social impact. The ride hailing
industry is one that is constantly evolving, and further research into how differing market
structures impact the driver experience in markets beyond China and Singapore may be worth
pursuing.
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